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America’s policy in Asia is evolving from itstwentieth-century, cold war past to some-thing resembling not so much a new
approach as one that would be familiar to any 
nineteenth-century statesman. It remains, as it was
during the cold war, fundamentally “realist,” oriented
around the maintenance of a balance of power. How-
ever, US policy has become less rigid than it was dur-
ing the cold war and places a greater emphasis on
maintaining maximum flexibility. Transitory part-
ners, security relationships, and so-called coalitions
of the willing have replaced allies as the principal
units of action. Multilateral organizations, and to
some extent formal alliances, are regarded as struc-
tures that inhibit the full exercise of American power.
While perhaps offering advantages in the pursuit
of some short-term goals, America’s focus on mili-
tary tools and its instinctive suspicion of multilat-
eral institutions are out of step with politics in Asia
today and contrary to long-term US interests in the
region. However “realist” in theory, this approach
suffers from two critical weaknesses: it abdicates
American leadership in shaping Asia’s security envi-
ronment, and its application enables nationalist agi-
tation and contributes to regional tensions.
THE SEDUCTION OF POWER POLITICS
American policy makers have long been likely to
identify themselves as “realists.” Senior members of
the current administration are, however, realists of a
more assertive character. For some, including Presi-
dent George W. Bush, the realpolitik practiced in the
late 1800s by the first chancellor of the German
Empire, Otto von Bismarck, represents a positive
model. Many view Asia, in particular, as having a
variety of characteristics in common with Europe in
the nineteenth century: underdeveloped international
institutions, mixed domestic orders, rising national-
ism, high but differential growth rates, and bitter,
emotional rivalries between insecure neighbors.
For American policy makers, as for Bismarck, this
environment offers fertile ground for the raw exer-
cise of power politics: a heavy emphasis on the mil-
itary tools of statecraft and fluid and rapidly shifting
patterns of alignment emanating from the core state.
In practice, US policy emphasizes cultivating part-
ners to balance China, a country some American
policy makers see as having parallels to Wilhelmine
Germany. Ironically, it is Washington’s present
realpolitik policy that is more Prussian in nature. 
America’s Bismarckian approach is misguided.
Even in the nineteenth century that approach led
to decidedly mixed results. It temporarily strength-
ened Germany’s position in Europe, but in the
hands of later, less adept practitioners it led to the
isolation and encirclement of Germany. This
approach also contributed to the rise in nationalist
sentiment that helped spark World War I. Not only
does American policy risk producing similar results
in Asia, it neglects two important aspects of the
contemporary regional landscape.
First, Asian leaders are organizing and building
new regional institutions to avoid precisely the sort
of power politics that America is practicing.
Progress has been tenuous but real, and most
regional leaders are cautiously optimistic about
Asia’s future. As long as this remains true, Ameri-
can emphasis on balance-of-power politics will con-
tinue to meet with only limited success. Indeed, this
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“US policy is not achieving the goals set out for it. It is ceding 
regional leadership while seeding regional rivalry. It is missing
opportunities to help shape the development of a new security 
environment through regional institutions and instead acting to 
exacerbate the rise of nationalism. . . .”
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approach is likely to be undermined by regional
players who are more interested in participating in
economic integration and building regional com-
munities than in divisive balancing behavior. Most
troubling, it will also cede America’s leadership role
in Asia and limit America’s ability to influence the
future shape of regional institutions. 
Second, US leaders do not appreciate the rising
dangers of manipulated nationalism in East Asia.
Increasingly over the past decade, political leaders
have played nationalist cards and exploited local
disputes to solidify their rule. This phenomenon
does not revolve narrowly around China’s rise and
great power rivalry; Asian democracies have been
as culpable as nondemocracies, and in both cases
domestic political causes are often evident.
Although the interests at stake are often more sym-
bolic than critical, nationalism can shape the 
long-term development of threat perceptions.
Unfortunately, US efforts to encourage more military
activism on the part of some allies have the 
potential to exacerbate
this problem.
In making this cri-
tique, we are not sug-
gesting that US policy
in Asia today is entirely
characterized by realpolitik or that power politics and
military calculations should play no part in future US
policy. We recognize the countercurrents within the
mainstream of American policy and also share an
appreciation of the dangers that face the region.
However, we are worried that US policy is not achiev-
ing the goals set out for it. The United States is ced-
ing regional leadership while seeding regional rivalry.
It is missing opportunities to help shape the devel-
opment of a new security environment through
regional institutions and instead acting to exacerbate
the rise of nationalism in important regional states.
The United States need not give up power politics
entirely. But to remain effective, it must also partici-
pate in regional institutions, rein in nationalist agita-
tion (even in allied nations), and reemphasize the
nonmilitary aspects of international diplomacy. 
ADDICTED TO BILATERALISM
While certainly not static, American policy
toward East Asia remains powerfully shaped by the
legacies of the cold war. The hub-and-spoke struc-
ture of bilateral alliances and loose economic insti-
tutionalism continue to provide the foundation for
Washington’s policy today. This approach has seen
modifications since the 9-11 terrorist attacks on
America, but these changes have further accentuated
the realpolitik aspects of US policy and dampened
some of the internationalism of the earlier period.
Most centrally, the US approach is structured
around bilateral relationships. As it has for decades,
Washington has continued to coax allies to do
more. Departing from business as usual, it has also
varied its treatment of allies, sought to add informal
allies to its roster, and adjusted its military deploy-
ments in the region. But these measures amount to
adjustments at the margins of America’s core hub-
and-spoke model for its engagement in East Asia. 
US dealings with Japan illustrate Washington’s
efforts to encourage a more active role from its allies.
At Washington’s urging, Tokyo has gradually shifted
away from dealing with the defense of its home
islands to other common regional and even global
security concerns. In February 2005, a joint state-
ment by Washington and Tokyo explicitly linked for
the first time the alliance’s interests with peace in the
Taiwan Strait. Today, Japan is a regular partner in US
military operations in the Middle East and is heavily




tration has shown a
greater willingness than
many past administrations to reward and punish
even close allies for the degree of their support for
current and rapidly evolving American policies. For
example, while the United States remains commit-
ted to the defense of South Korea, President Roh
Moo-hyun’s disagreements with President Bush
over North Korea strategy have taken a toll on the
relationship, as have Seoul’s deepening ties with
China. While Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi spends days at the Bush ranch during his
visits to the United States, Roh was given only 45
minutes with the US president during his June 2005
visit. Canberra’s stock in Washington, on the other
hand, has risen as Australia has become a junior
partner to the United States in Asia and beyond.
Viewed from the region, US treatment of allies often
appears arrogant and unpredictable. 
US relations with Singapore and India, though
not blessed with the holy water of formal treaty,
have nevertheless taken on trappings of an alliance.
Singapore is increasingly important to the Ameri-
can military presence in Southeast Asia. Changi
Naval Base serves as a valuable logistics hub and
waypoint for forces flowing through the region and
has hosted American warships, including aircraft
carriers, since 2001. In July 2005, Washington and
Singapore deepened this relationship by signing a
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security framework agreement with provisions for
annual strategic talks, joint military exercises, and
cooperation in military research and development.
Washington is also attempting to develop a proto-
alliance with New Delhi. Some view India’s bulk and
posture as a counterweight to China. The appoint-
ment of Robert Blackwill, an advocate of an “Asian
NATO,” as ambassador to New Delhi in July 2001
marked one attempt to capitalize on this potential,
as did the recent signing of the “New Framework for
the US-India Defense Relationship.” Thus far, the
benefits to India from this outreach are clearer than
New Delhi’s willingness to play the role imagined for
it in Washington. Material efforts to consummate the
relationship with India have included offers by
Washington to license co-production of advanced F-
16 aircraft and to sell and cooperate in the further
development of missile defense systems, as well as
completed sales of counter-battery radars. Most
recently, the Bush administration has agreed to pro-
vide advanced technical support for India’s civilian
nuclear program—never mind India’s nuclear
weapon tests in 1998. The offer marks a dramatic
reversal of previous policy, under which Washington
did not provide such assistance to states that are not
part of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.
CASUAL COALITIONS
In addition to these bilateral initiatives, Wash-
ington has sought to organize ad hoc purpose-built
“coalitions of the willing.” In doing so, however, it
has assiduously avoided the full institutionalization
of these groupings. Perhaps the best example is the
so-called six-party talks designed explicitly and
solely for the purpose of addressing the North
Korean nuclear issue. In addition to the United
States and North Korea, the group includes North
Korea’s most important sources of aid and trade:
South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. Needless to
say, this assemblage is not restricted to formal allies.
Its meetings are irregular. There has been much talk
of institutionalizing some variant of it (presumably
minus North Korea) as a regional forum that would
stand beyond the resolution of the nuclear crisis.
However, the idea has had little apparent support
inside the administration, especially since the
departure of Secretary of State Colin Powell and his
deputies from the State Department.
Another example is the Proliferation Security Ini-
tiative (PSI). Ostensibly, the PSI’s purpose is to
strengthen the enforcement of existing laws on air
and, especially, maritime traffic to impede the pro-
liferation of weapons of mass destruction. Many
regard it as primarily a vehicle aimed at North
Korea. What is most notable about the PSI is its very
lack of formality. Originally based on a statement of
principles by a handful of nations in September
2003, the PSI is often referred to as “an activity, not
an organization.” Under its rubric, nations partici-
pate in various exercises or operations essentially
on an a la carte basis. Notably, despite its present
focus on North Korea, currently neither South
Korea nor China actively takes part. 
Other coalitions of the willing have been orga-
nized for the tsunami relief effort at the end of 2004
and the war on terror in Southeast Asia. Shortly
after last year’s tsunami, Washington quickly orga-
nized a “core group” of nations most capable of pro-
viding humanitarian assistance outside of the usual
institutional channels of the United Nations. For
more than a week, this core group essentially served
as the sole coordinating body for relief efforts. Only
later was that mission turned over to the UN. In the
case of the war on terror, Washington originally
funded a Regional Center for Counterterrorism,
established in Kuala Lumpur in 2003, but it no
longer participates in it. Because of the extreme sen-
sitivity of Southeast Asian governments to Ameri-
can involvement in the global war on terror, most
of Washington’s coordination has instead been
undertaken through relatively quiet, bilateral
engagement with individual governments, or, in the
case of port and airport security, through the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC).
One area of American policy that traditionally
has not been organized around bilateral relation-
ships has been its multilateral and global promotion
of economic openness. But for a variety of reasons,
this penchant has fewer outlets and receives less
attention today than it did during the cold war. The
Doha round of World Trade Organization talks has
bogged down despite America’s best efforts. Mean-
while, APEC, the primary American vehicle for pro-
moting regional openness, no longer enjoys
substantial support in the region. This is a result in
part of Washington’s pressure on the group to focus
more on security issues. But it also is a consequence
of APEC’s expansion to Latin America—a move
pushed by Washington but unpopular in Asia—and
the development of indigenous institutions in Asia.
These shifts have undermined the major element of
American policy that used to fall outside of the tra-
ditional balance-of-power approach. 
CEDING LEADERSHIP
In theory, America’s Bismarckian Asia policy, with
its emphasis on flexibility and power, has merit. It
seems reasonably well suited to address some of the
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challenges posed by North Korea’s nuclear ambi-
tions and Chinese policy toward Taiwan. However,
in practice, America’s reluctance to engage actively
with multilateral institutions and its narrow mili-
tary focus ignore new opportunities and dangers in
the Asian environment and, as a consequence, are
self-defeating. Opposition to America’s balance-of-
power approach to regional problems—and to the
rise of China in particular—has limited US influ-
ence. Indeed, the American approach in Asia has
created a leadership vacuum into which China can
and has adroitly stepped.
One of the most important trends in Asia today is
the rise of regional institutions. Foremost among
these are progeny of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN): the ASEAN Regional Forum
(with 24 countries, the principal forum for security
dialogue in the Asia Pacific region); ASEAN+3 (ASEAN




step in the evolution
of ASEAN+3).
These institutions
are in various stages of development, but taken
together they enhance transparency, constrain or at
least define acceptable norms of behavior, and
address transnational problems. They are also
beginning to consider the domestic political behav-
ior of member states. More important, they are the
locus of regional efforts for economic integration.
Regional institutions and economic integration
were central to the European Union’s political
development over the past 50 years, and many
Asians hope for similar effects in their region over
the next 50. 
The United States is not entirely outside of this
network of Asian multilateral institutions. It
remains the driving force within APEC. Indeed, per-
haps nothing symbolizes America’s preoccupation
with military security, especially its own, more
than Washington’s push to shift APEC’s focus from
economic issues to counterterrorism. Nevertheless,
the charge of “American distraction” resonates
widely in Asia. For instance, President Bush spent
less than 24 hours in Australia during his first visit
to that country in October 2003 and was heckled
in parliament. Chinese President Hu Jintao, arriv-
ing shortly after the American president, spent two
weeks touring the country, signed a number of
economic agreements, and was fêted by a wide
variety of groups. An almost identical sequence of
events transpired during the 2004 APEC meeting in
Santiago, Chile. Most recently, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice failed to attend the July 2005
ASEAN Regional Forum, prompting a chorus of
regional complaints. 
In contrast, China has actively embraced regional
institutions, and thus enhanced its reputation and
influence. In 1995, it initiated a dialogue among the
so-called Shanghai Five (China, Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), which met to discuss
confidence-building measures and later evolved into
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Beijing has
been one of the most enthusiastic members of
ASEAN+3. In late 2000, China began discussing a free
trade agreement with ASEAN. To secure the success of
those negotiations, in November 2002 it also signed
a “declaration of conduct” with ASEAN covering activ-
ities in the South China Sea. In addition, it has taken
a more active role in the Asian Development Bank
and was the prime mover in the establishment of the
Boao Forum, Asia’s
answer to Davos. All
of these initiatives
can be grouped under
the rubric of China’s
“new security con-
cept,” which emphasizes cooperative (win-win) secu-
rity, confidence building, and multilateral engagement.
The popularity China has garnered from these
activities is no doubt also enhanced by the economic
opportunities it presents to regional states. Over the
past five years, Chinese trade has grown by an
annual average of 27 percent. In the past two years,
Japan and South Korea have reached symbolic
crossover points: for each, trade with China now
exceeds trade with the United States. China’s trade
with ASEAN is on course to do the same over the next
year or two. Yet, without China’s active engagement
of multilateral institutions, its growing bulk might
provoke more fear than admiration, much as it did
during the early and mid-1990s. Beijing’s multilat-
eral engagement has enabled it to improve its mate-
rial position and its image simultaneously. The fact
that this engagement furthers Chinese interests does
not make it any less welcome in the region.
REPUTATION MATTERS
In light of China’s evolving international posture,
America’s balance-of-power politics has limited and
arguably diminishing appeal. True, Japan has
availed itself of the opportunity to move closer to
the United States, and most regional capitals hedge
their bets against future uncertainty by maintaining
defense relations with Washington. However, most
are reluctant to adopt rhetoric or take actions that
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hint at anti-Chinese intent. Even Australia, having
recently sealed lucrative resource deals with China,
is averse to offend its new partner. Canberra was
cool to the idea of an Asian NATO as far back as
2001. More recently, Australian Foreign Minister
Alexander Downer publicly demurred on whether
a Sino-American conflict over Taiwan would require
Australia to go to war in support of the United
States. Southeast Asian leaders have been even less
comfortable with efforts aimed too evidently at
China. India also has hedged, signing a “strategic
partnership” with China, even as it acquires
advanced weapons from the United States.
More broadly, the contrast between American
power politics and Chinese multilateral engagement
has helped shift world and regional perceptions of
both states. Globally, two recent surveys show that
Beijing is regarded as a more constructive member of
international society than Washington. Similarly,
many among the South Korean elites inside and out-
side of government talk openly of China as a leader,
and sometimes the most important leader, in Asia.
These warm feelings toward China peaked in August
2004 when fully 80 percent of Korean lawmakers
ranked China ahead of the United States as Seoul’s
most important trade and business partner. A 2005
survey by the Lowry Institute of International Affairs
shows that, although 72 percent of Australians sup-
port the alliance with the United States, more of
them view China favorably than the United States. 
The American-led tsunami relief effort in 2004
provides a glimpse of an alternative way forward. It
is the exception that proves the rule. In this case, the
United States addressed a pressing local need and
benefited massively in terms of goodwill gained. The
United States proved that—in a real world crisis—
the resources it could bring to bear were far greater
than those of China or anyone else. American gov-
ernment aid was 10 times that of China, and almost
twice that of Japan. The disparity is even wider if
private contributions are considered. As a result, the
2005 Pew Global Attitudes Survey reports that 79
percent of Indonesians viewed the United States
“more favorably” after the tsunami relief effort. 
Two points make this case stand out. First, mili-
tary assets were used for political-economic pur-
poses instead of the reverse. Second, and perhaps
more important, the United States did not capital-
ize fully on its success. Had an attempt been made
to institutionalize the very effective cooperation led
by the United States, Japan, India, and others,
Washington would have been seen to be shaping
future international relations, rather than simply
responding to the weather. 
Granted, US policy should not be geared primar-
ily to appease mass audiences in Asia. American
policy must serve American interests. However,
policies that unnecessarily alienate potential part-
ners and undermine America’s ability to secure
cooperation damage US interests. Public opinion
matters. A decade ago, it forced the United States to
abandon its bases in the Philippines. Today public
sentiment in South Korea threatens to unravel its
alliance with America.
Nowhere is public opinion more important cur-
rently than in America’s relations with the Islamic
world, including the Muslim nations of Asia.
Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
had sought ways to improve ties with the United
States, but had been limited by the Indonesian pub-
lic’s suspicion of US motives. In the wake of Amer-
ica’s tsunami relief efforts, Yudhoyono pledged
deeper cooperation on terrorism and has moved to
arrest additional terrorism suspects.
AROUSING PASSIONS
There is, of course, no inevitability in the devel-
opment of East Asian solidarity. Another possible
path for the region is intensified competition. Per-
haps the biggest drawback to America’s Asia policy
is that it fails to do much to lessen intraregional ten-
sions and, at times, exacerbates them. 
Although it has received considerably less ana-
lytical attention than regional integration, the rising
incidence of manipulated nationalism by regional
leaders represents a second, less propitious Asian
trend. The US media have been quickest to highlight
Chinese misbehavior in this regard, but it has also
been evident in the actions of Taiwanese, South
Korean, and Japanese politicians. Despite differences
in historical circumstances and contemporary
stakes, two important commonalties are evident.
First, although national interests are usually at issue,
they are often of a secondary or symbolic nature.
Second, domestic political and social considerations
appear to loom large in the motivation of key actors
to engage in such rabble-rousing. 
Both of these elements were on display in this
year’s surge in tensions between South Korea and
Japan over the ownership of the Dokdo Islands
(Japan refers to them as the Takeshima). Ownership
of these 0.2 square kilometers of land does confer ter-
ritorial fishing and mineral rights so the islands do
have some material significance, but for the two
industrialized nations involved, the relative economic
stakes are paltry. Acquired by Japan at the conclusion
of the Russo-Japanese War, the status of the islands
was left unsettled by the San Francisco Peace Treaty
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following World War II. In 1954, South Korea occu-
pied the islands, but Japan has since continued to
assert its sovereignty. Fast forward to March 2005:
Japan’s Shimane Prefecture Council passed an ordi-
nance declaring February 22 as “Takeshima Day.”
South Korea’s President Roh responded by vowing “a
tough diplomatic war with Japan,” and protesters
tried to fire flaming arrows into the Japanese ambas-
sador’s home. In Korean politics, a tough stance
toward Japan almost always plays well, and Roh’s
numbers rose after his declaration of diplomatic war.
South Korea dispatched additional naval units to the
islands, and Japan likewise sent heavily armed Coast
Guard vessels to the area. In July, the South Korean
navy christened its first amphibious transport—an
18,000-ton vessel with a flat helicopter landing deck
that bears a striking resemblance to a light aircraft
carrier—the Dokdo. 
The Dokdo case is far from isolated. Japan is a
participant in bitter disputes over no fewer than four
groups of islands with three of its neighbors (South
Korea, China, and Rus-
sia). The Senkaku Islands
dispute (Diaoyu Islands
for the Chinese) is similar
in many respects to the
Dokdo problem, with the
added complication that
activists from Hong Kong
and Taiwan are involved along with nationalists
from mainland China and Japan. Following the
Japanese arrest of Taiwanese fishermen in disputed
waters in June 2005, the Taiwanese defense minis-
ter and speaker of parliament boarded naval frigates
for a protest cruise off the islands. Japan’s Prime
Minister Koizumi staged a similar photo opportu-
nity in September 2004, embarking on a coast guard
vessel and sailing near northern islands controlled
by Russia but claimed by Tokyo. 
In the familiar Sino-Japanese conflict regarding
grievances from the past century, neither side is
entirely blameless. Certainly Japan’s treatment of its
appalling imperialism in the 1930s and 1940s has
been grossly inaccurate, and Tokyo deserves the
blame for repeatedly aggravating the issue through
official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine to Japan’s war
dead. However, China, too, manipulates national-
ism, celebrating a mythological struggle by the
Communist Party against Japan in World War II and
changing its own textbooks in the late 1980s to
stress Japanese atrocities, as well as to downplay
both Japan’s postwar democracy and its aid to China
after 1972. Chinese media coverage appears to
inflame deliberately the passions of the populace
against Japan and selectively exploits contemporary
disputes to buttress the regime’s legitimacy. “Rally
‘round the flag” effects are useful to political officials
in authoritarian countries as well as democracies.
SEEDING RIVALRY
The manipulation of nationalist sentiment by
regional leaders and the various disputes it has
driven impinge on US interests. Already, these
grievances distract from critical issues. There is no
question that, at key points over the past year,
China, South Korea, and Japan have all been
focused as much on their disputes with one another
as they have been on resolving the nuclear crisis in
North Korea. When Taiwanese President Chen
Shui-bian’s exploitation of identity politics and the
island’s sovereignty issue precipitated a storm across
the Taiwan Strait in 2004, managing the crisis
demanded intensive top-level attention by US offi-
cials when they might otherwise have been focused
on North Korea or the Middle East. And South
Korea’s disputes with
Japan have pushed Seoul
even closer to Beijing
than economic interests
or generational change
alone would have done. 
Washington’s heavy
emphasis on cultivating
security partners may, without the careful consider-
ation and management of secondary effects, exacer-
bate the problem. Tokyo’s more active military
posture, for example, has been accompanied by
increased historical revisionism and a rightward
political tilt. At least two US government officials
have publicly supported Japanese constitutional revi-
sion. Yet one set of draft amendments (sponsored by
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party) includes lan-
guage calling for government efforts to foster nation-
alist spirit. Even without an amendment, the
Education Ministry has urged history textbook
authors to tone down descriptions of Japan’s wartime
atrocities. Education Minister Nariaki Nakayama
welcomed the demise of the term “comfort women”
(that is, sex slaves) in these texts. Further, in a typi-
cal example of comments that undermine the per-
ceived sincerity of Japanese apologies, Nakayama
quoted a supporter’s letter, in which the author sug-
gested that sex slaves should be proud of having
eased the unsettled minds of Japanese soldiers. 
Although a more assertive nationalism may serve
some US goals with regard to Japan, it carries costs.
Most immediately, it undermines Japan’s leadership
potential in the region. To the extent that the United
248 • CURRENT HISTORY • September 2005
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States is seen as aiding and abetting or ignoring
Japanese chauvinism, it raises questions about the
purpose and balance of US policy. Although not as
sensitive to historical issues as South Korea or
China, even some Southeast Asian foreign policy
elites are asking their American counterparts why
the United States remains mute. In the end, US
silence on this issue may damage US interests more
directly. Once Japan has broken its legal and consti-
tutional bonds, America’s instrumental utility to the
Japanese Defense Agency and establishment con-
servatives will decline. At that point, whether Tokyo
continues to act in concert with Washington will
depend, in large measure, on the degree to which
Japan remains a vibrant democracy. 
US cultivation of India as a military partner also
carries potential risks, particularly in its implica-
tions for stability along the “line of control” in
Kashmir. US-manufactured counter-battery radar
may give India a decisive edge in the frequent
artillery exchanges across the line of control, and
advanced F-16 fighter aircraft increase Indian capa-
bilities for strategic attacks on both China and Pak-
istan. The impact on military stability is
unpredictable, but the freer rein these capabilities
give to Hindu nationalists is problematic.
Although the immediate stakes in many of these
disputes may appear trivial, in any of them the rise
of nationalist sentiment could lead to escalatory spi-
rals or security dilemmas, where even defensive mea-
sures are interpreted by neighbors as offensive.
American policy should actively counteract such sen-
timent rather than tacitly permitting it to flourish.
A MORE BALANCED APPROACH
None of this is to suggest that the United States
should not continue to develop military ties with
regional states. Indeed, US policy has scored some
important achievements in this regard. A number
of states in Asia have become global military part-
ners. South Korea and Japan have deployed troops
to Iraq. Australian forces have engaged in combat
operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. New
arrangements with Singapore have added substan-
tially to American military agility and global reach.
Within the region, robust partnerships provide a
hedge against future trouble. 
These successes notwithstanding, America’s rigid
and narrow focus in Asia on balance-of-power align-
ments and military security incurs significant costs.
First, it limits the American role in the region to only
a hedge against uncertainty, rather than making the
United States a central player in ongoing efforts to
shape the regional economic and political order. Sec-
ond, to the extent that US policy does not consider
and address both the international and domestic by-
products of military activism, it exacerbates regional
tensions. It contributes, in the longer term, to pre-
cisely the instability that it seeks to manage. The
problems with American policy toward Asia are not
caused by inexorable changes in the structure of the
international system, but rather are products of
America’s approach to the region. 
The United States should make three adjustments
to its Asia policy: supplement bilateral security rela-
tionships with active support for multilateral orga-
nizations; make a top priority of efforts to deepen
liberal democracy in the region; and rebalance the
overall approach to give the State Department an
equal voice at the table with the Pentagon. Imple-
menting each of these adjustments will require
strong leadership to overcome bureaucratic inertia
and entrenched ideologies.
First, the United States needs to take a much
more active role in promoting (rather than subtly
undermining or at best passively attending) the
development of institutions in Asia. The deepening
and hardening of ASEAN should be welcomed.
Southeast Asia, the natural “Balkans of Asia,” has
proved to be the area most resistant to the perni-
cious trend of manipulated crisis and nationalism,
and much of the credit must be given to ASEAN. US
economic treaties should be offered to ASEAN as a
whole, rather than negotiated piecemeal with its
members. The United States should support the fur-
ther development of the ASEAN Regional Forum and
deepen security cooperation with ASEAN as a whole
whenever possible. It should also work to develop
more focused groupings that nevertheless include
both key allies and China. The most obvious
choices would be a more permanent and regular
spin-off from the six-party talks on North Korea’s
nuclear program or an official version of the track-
two (nongovernmental) Northeast Asian Coopera-
tion Dialogue. These will not substitute for bilateral
alliances in the region, but they will provide addi-
tional venues for American leadership.
Second, the United States should pursue a con-
sistent democracy agenda in the region. In non-
democratic states, it should support the
development of civil society and legal reform, as
well as pressing for elections. Washington should
also hold its democratic allies to high standards of
political and foreign policy behavior. It should not
tolerate or encourage nationalist agitation, even if
populist appeals would support the short-term
goal of encouraging military activism. On the con-
trary, it is in Washington’s broader interest to
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encourage key nations (for example, Japan, South
Korea, and China) to address their historic
grievances regarding the legacies of World War II.
Historical manipulation threatens the very sus-
tainability of democracy in the countries that prac-
tice it, as well as international trust and stability.
Given America’s interests in Asia, it would likely
get involved in any major war in the region,
regardless of its cause. The United States should
ensure that nationalism does not increase the
probability of such conflict erupting. 
Third, the United States should reemphasize non-
military components of its foreign policy such as
diplomatic, economic, cultural, and political tools.
There are some indications that, with former US
Trade Representative Robert Zoellick now serving as
deputy secretary of state, US government engage-
ment with Asia is broadening to include more atten-
tion to economic issues. Still much remains to be
done to balance US policy. The 15-to-1 mismatch
between military spending and financial support for
all other aspects of foreign policy is enormous and
counterproductive. More cultural exchange, eco-
nomic openness (yes, even to investment from
China), and social interchange would improve
America’s image and lessen popular opposition
abroad to US leadership. Even deeper cuts in subsi-
dies for primary industries could reinvigorate the
promotion of global openness in World Trade Orga-
nization talks. Aid budgets should also be increased
substantially. Finally, and perhaps most important,
the State Department needs substantial increases in
manpower and authority. American military com-
manders in many areas of the world act as procon-
suls. That befits a military imperialist power, not a
nation that desires to lead more by example and
“soft power” than by force.
None of these policies would be easy to imple-
ment, but the costs of continuing with Washing-
ton’s outdated Bismarckian strategy are high.
Western Europe has definitively transcended its
nineteenth-century political order through institu-
tionalized cooperation. Europe’s enlightened poli-
cies produced economic integration, liberal
domestic order in European Union states, and a
sense of security and community. The United
States has the wherewithal to help lead a similar
process in Asia today. Can it wean itself from the
seductive but destructive simplicity of anachronis-
tic realpolitik-centered policies? ■
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